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B: .•.... -; . a guerrilla leader and I was a captain in the Army, and we 
got together when he was being offered the position of secreta,ry of na,ti_ona.l 
defense. You know, he is not a professional soldier; he wa.s a guerrilla. 
lea.der, a,nd he asked me, what will I tell President Quirino? Well, I told 
him, you tell him we a.re going to fight this war in an unconventional wa.y. 
Tell him they are making a mistake to think this is a regular war, this is-
very different. And so on, a.nd so on, and so on •. And that is just wha.t he 
told President Quirino. I said, you tell him we will send all the officers 
in the Army headquarters out in the field. There are so many of them hiding 
behind desks, they will a.11 go out in the field. Tell him that we a.re going 
to use dogs, we will use everything that we ca.n think- of. This ;ts a different 
kind of warfare. He got the job, and when he got the job, I sa,id, now, I 
a.m in Ba,ngkok a.s milita.ry atta.chee in Ba.ngkok; so I told him, I a.m going ba,ck 
now. Oh, Lord, you stay with me--I will make you my chief of intelligence. 
I sa.id, no, tha_t doesn't sound good--you the secreta,ry and me--no, it doesn't 
sound good. I said, you let me go back to the wa,r a,nd I will pick_ up some 
more new ideas a.nd I will let you know. So I went to the war in Vietnam, and 
a.fter tha,t I went to the wa.r in Ma.yla.sia.. I "Eried to find out the experience 
of the French, a.nd then the experience of the British ••• well, I got commended, 
the secretary, chief of staff, was sending me wires; and then a.11 of a sudden, 
you a.re recalled, you come home. To stay with him and sit down beside him; 
my gosh this is going to be a. boring job. I like the open, I like the-,,. 
then r found out why. He- ha,d one a.ssista.nt, Col. Regal Csp?) who wa.s my 
brother-in-la.w, Col. Rega.l Csp?) wa.s another guerrilla. fighter, once a. 
professional soldier, but he wa.s more of a poet a,nd a writer tha,n a. soldier, 
And his wife a,nd my wife were sisters. You know, he wa,s Ma,gsa,ys·a.y' s a.ssista.nt 
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and I knew why, he wants to leave. This is terrible.. And I: saw 
mounds of papers- on top of the table. I said, this is· not the way to ;r:un 
a wa.r with. a.11 thes-e papers . ' . 
Background voice: •.. still secretary of nati_onal de.fe.nse.? 
B; He was secretary of national defense. So t went ove,r all tlie. pa,pe,i;'s· 
a,nd then at 7 o'clock in the morni,ng I went in the hous:e o;f · Mi;i,gsa,ysay. r was 
ve-x;y- angry because I was relieved. I didn't want to he cha.ir-:Oou:nd; I want to 
be ;i,n the. f;i,_eld. Re knew that I didn't like the joh. The very fi,rs:t time., 
after breakfast, r say, you sign these. At first I didn'tt know- tlie trick., 
You know, he was signing, and all of a sudden he would say, ah., tnat is enougli.. 
I am very, very tired. Then I lea;rned how to hi.de all the papers under tne~ 
table. I put only one paper up. He never knew how many pape,1:;s he was si:gni::ng. 
So in that way after two days he went back to the office. and said, what nappened 
to all the. papers on this ta,ble? I said, you have signed them all. That is 
how we got along, because. he. could not find any more paper after that, For 
the next two yea.rs we were together. • In short, it was a combination of hi_s-
guerrilla knowledge and my professional knowledge; by that time I was: also a 
graduate of Ft. Benning, I was a graduate already of the commander _____ _ 
school .• • 
C: I:n Ft. Leavenwo:i::th ••• 
J: ••• in Ft. Leaven1«0:i::th., and I -.:«as a graduate alrea,dy, of the. intelligence 
school i _n Ft. Wiley (sp?l. So r was very . professional. During tne war I was 
a battalion commander, And it was a good combinati.on, In the beginning I: 
didn't believe he wi.11 be a great man. But r came to pick. up certain 
chara,ctecr i .sti.cs: i_n him that we;1:;e really very· genuine, ye:r;y ~incere, a,nd a.long 
that t;r:ack, we went along. first a very deep sens-e of justice, a very ------
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B: deep sense of justice Cunintelligible) and to the smallest things·. 
Second, it is· a.s I saJ_d · s dcnceri ty. You ha.ve g-ot to be very si.ncere, not beca,us:e 
o;f;your political objective, but because that is- how you feel a.bout it. 
Third, you are always in a hurry. Things that we feel should have. been done. 
ye.sterda,y, a.re still undone toda,y, and they should ha,-ve. been ;f;in;i:shed 1,ong-
ago. Time is a.lways of the essence. And fourth is: the personal touch .• · We 
do not (dogs ba,rking, unintelligi.ble). We approach. men, a.s ma,n ta ma,n. 
(summary; exa,mple of someone comes in wanting job; find out more about Fti:m,; 
try to find job. Specia.lized attention). Wha,t else? I us:ed to tell him he 
wa.s subversive of good discipline--beca.use you bypass all the. intervening 
layers of command. You go direct. I sa,id what is your justification · :fo:t; tlia.t? 
You know wha,t he told me? Emergency, Csumma,ry; conve.rsa,tion, I studied la,w, 
judge every case on decis:ions on s;i:mi.lar easel. He said, no, to me, every 
ca,se is a new case, Wha.t can you do with a man who thinks that every case is 
a new ca,se? Therefore, every case had to be studied in all its angles . 
There is some.thing good a.bout that, you know. You know· that is souiething 
with. Ma.g-says.a.y, telling me tha,t no, there ;i._s no precedent; every- ca,s-e- is a. 
new case. And I decide a,11 the ca,ses. 
C: How di._d you come to meet General La.ns,da.le-? 
R: Well, ok., those we;r::e the yec;l.rs· when we were fi:.ghttng ha,rd a,gq,;i:nst 
the Huks. Here come Ed. Who wa.s the pres;ldent then, Eisenhower? 
C: Yes. 
B; Well, I.ke, na.tura,lly ha,s a deep liki.ng- far Mc;l.g-saysay. Also wheneve:t; 
United sta.tes ?? 
in a, country the;i:;e ;i:_s .t.nsta,hl ;U;i.ty a,nd the. nat;i.ona,l int~ests are- ;L_nvolyed, 
na. turall y the U •;,, will look for the strong- ma,n. Right? And ;i:_f tlie. strong 
ma.n happens to fit the description of that ideal :ma.n, the. bette;r. They wt.11 
back up that man--right? And so here came in Magsaysay and this· .t.s just like-
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B; the man. You know, from ever ything that you hear a,bout him, he i s-
the ·man. And the. Arrler;i'.ca,n way ;Ls naturally, I will give you support. And 
there is no l ;i:..m:;tt ta that support, And the fellow bel;Leves also i.n tiie 
ca,us-e of that ma,n, a,nd the. two are identifiable. The. fight against the 
Huks. And so the two ca.me to like each other. Ed was softspoken, very 
humble, with. lots of initiative, new ideas. Somebody who wa,s very much_ 
like Magsaysay right away. When Ed came in, I don't knowwnethe.r he was 
attached to MAAG right away, psychological warfare or something. I said 
to :Magsaysay, what is the difference, adviser of what or what, so long as 
h.e. is there, then us will progress. Us will face more problems, we became 
more and more dependent on the man who can give us ideas and support, And 
so the meetings become more frequent. They have their own safe hous-es: where 
to meet, and the two became so intimate. And you know, Magsaysay he. is· so 
st.mple; he does not have the trappings of a potentate.. He wants to be a, 
simple farmer . And that I s how the two came to li.ke ea,ch other. They nave 
similar ta,stes; one ;ts innovative, the other one is very recepti.ve. Tiie. 
other one i .s brave a,nd wi lling to take. the ri.sk. I can see quickly when 
one gives him a formula, he picks ;lt up quickly, a,nd off they go, The 
trai.ned 
ideal;ism , l was not very much involved with them , because we were/ in the 
Army not to indulge in polit:ics. We were not even allowed to vote at that 
time. we were strictly neutral, when it comes to poli.tics·, I myself ha,ve 
no love for politics, My father was a congressman, My father forcedme to 
transfer from engineering to law, thinking that l would follow his· footsteps. 
(summary: lea,der in high school). So when Magsaysay was having these things 
wi .th. Ed, I would not bather--I stayed to my job, 
Ed a.nd me got close in Vietnam, after we are through the. H11k.s tlie~e . 
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B: There was the Dien Bien Phu, was being fought. :r went ther e., heca.uae 
the Geneva. Conference (summary: 77going ta Geneva, didn't kno w wha,t fui,ppen;til.g 
in Indochina, so I was sent. No diplomatic relati.ans with-Vietnam. French_· 
really running whole show, ) went as observer, supposed to sta.y only for 3 rnontns·, 
but developed on into 5 years, because 4 months later on, Ed arrived, And 
when Ed arrived he said, Joe, will you give me a brie-fing? :r gave fiim nriefing, 
a.nd he said, wait awh_ile. I will take notes, and that became. 3 hour bri efings: 
because we discus·sed what we should do the next 2 y~rs. At that time. ;r could 
see the future, uncanny feeling :i: could see what was· coming, So I. told him what 
we have to do in I.ndochina, that ;ts government of the people, · by the people. 
and for the people in order to be viable. At that time the. Vi.e.tnamese were. 
hold;i:ng only 4 ministries, and the bulk of the mini.stries were being Iie.ld D;{' 
the French. How can you call this a Vietnamese government? Y:ou ·are just 
fooling yourself. The French. are behind the whole thing. Dien Bien Pfiuwas 
being fought and the:t;'e was the poss;i:.bility of the French getting defeated , 
and we had to start a new pol;Lticc).l order. Na. turally we stq,rt thinkiJ.1.g, a,nd 
so I told him, where to make the independence o:f; the V;i:.etnames.e real ana that 
means the. French has to get out. Of course, that was, at tnat time. not too 
acceptable to the French. (summary: French holding on to thei.r powers to end. r 
said must strive for new constitution, and Asian h :r;:others called in to help; 
:!;ind way for Vietnamese to express through. ballot; establish- a government; 
foremost will be sec urity. Also I told him of; Philippine hi.story ; how-
Amer;tcans establ i shed government here; MacArthur was he.r e-; s.tarted on politicaJ 
reforms·, Everything still has to be militarily defended,. Phi.l i pp;i:ne can be 
model in Vietnam, I said. L Under tha,t f;irst pla,nn;tng we took up helping the. 
government achieve s:ome kind of stability with a better interior fo r ce, not 
a fighting army, but the interior force. We sent Vietnamese in big groups here 
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B: to study. And we organized in Vietnam RFP, .• 
C: Regional Force ... 
B: So the thing is that I said that from my government you know we are 
a small country, don't have much to give, but we ca.n assist. And I said to 
my mi.nd, the place where we can assist and not get into the line of fire of 
the French is in the medical field. I told Ed that perhaps we could help in 
the alleviation of the problems ;i.n Vietnam at that ti.me by sending ,medical 
teams . in Vietnam. we implemented that not only there but ;ln Laos. Then, of 
course, we had a successful year in the Philipp;i.nes in what we called the 
civic actions, the approach to the people. I said that since the United 
States forces that might be involved in Vietnam will need assistance in some 
way, in a technical way, then we. have to get the techn;i._cians from the 
Philippines. That became the proposal for the Freedom Company. We started 
£:rom scratch. Ed, myself, The. American embassy was at that time Wc\S not an 
embassy, ;i.t was a legat;i.on. And so for me my immediate propos:al was for 
med;i.cal teams to come in. It is a starting point, It i .s humanitarian, so 
the French could not say, you are intervening, interfe;r:-ing, French_ difficult; 
would not allow Vietnamese to go out ... you know, I went to Vi.etna,m prior to 
tha.t for one week, in November 1950, and on November 11, that is the Armistice 
Day, I was invited to the. house of the American minister to celebra,te Armi.st;lce 
Day. I met the chief of the USJS . I was asked on wha,t role can the Philippines 
play ;i.n Vietna.m? (material omitted--sa,t beside an Ame-rican on a. pla,ne. How 
can Phil;i.ppi,nes and Vietnamese get along? Mi.ni.ster, dentist, boyscouts got out 
of Sa;i.gon, came to Philippines . ) :Cn Vietnam you never present a project as: 
your project, but as a Vietna,mese project. That's how-we pushed through- all 
of our pro9ra,ni$ in vtetnam, as a Vietnamese project . Cmateri_a,1 omi,tted: a,- · Fi.l;i.pino 
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B: said he knew author of a project is Banzon; Banzon told him to shut 
up.1 So everything is tn the. name of the Vletnamese. 
C: You sai.d you stayed in SaJgon 4 years·, .• What was your position tne;t:,'e,'? 
B: 5 years. First as a military observer, and later on r had to work 
-., recognition 
?• 
for the 11\3::B~:i:efi/of Vietnam by the Philippines. It was: an issue i .n the 
Philippines. There were pol;i.ticia.ns who were figh_ti,ng Magsays·ay agains·t tne 
recognition 
Philippine government extending · / to the g0vernment of Vie:tnaro. But once.-
opened 
we. had been able to extend recognition, we e:19efta diplomatic relations. 
C; When was· that done? 
B; Later part of '56, I think. And I was the first military attachee. 
I got Magsaysay to sign the papers one evening when we went out driving, and 
when we come back, I said, you sign. Magsaysay: too much opposition. 
(omitted: conversation about signing, not signing). He signed it, 
Bo wanted to get the papers and fly lt himself, we said, no. 
(omitted: then I run back to Vi.etna.m. Everybody say hurry, waiting for 
you. I say have to change to my barong. Went to palace, pres.·s there. l You 
know why the president was in .a hurry? Tha.t day was the a.nni:vel;'sa,ry of tfie. 
_____ of Vietnam, and early in the morning there was a faig mob, sacked tlie 
Majestic Hotel (American socialite there, omitted). And the president wanted 
a counter on that very day to show the world there is one country· that recogniz~ 
them. It was a long story. 
C: In what ways did you work with General Lansdale during those 4 years? 
B: We did it together. First, you know, I have no logistics whatsoever . 
Meaning, I can give you ideas but that's all. It is run by itself. Somy 
role is thi.s: I know more of the Asian psychology. I am an Asian, I know tI:ie 
Vietnamese. The American is suspect by the Vietnamese; this is why from the 
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B: shoes: of the French, you see. But when it is a Filipino who, it is 
a.nothe;1; thJng; a brother. Somebody who puts the Arner;t_can closer to the 
-Vi..etnames-e. That's our role. And so when I call all my re.latives to go to 
Vietnam to start Operation Brotherhood. Oscar Arrellano, his- father was: my-
godfather. And Oscar Arrellano went to Saigon w;tth Monching 
is now ambassador to Canada. These two went there and they sa.id, we a,re 
Ering:tng ·medicines- :for a. cl;tnic. And then Dr. Wong (sp?l, a. Chinese doctor 
who ;ts a very civic spirited man was the one with. the JC' r;,, So they ta,lRed 
of having more substantial assistance through the JC's of Sa,igon by medic1ne, 
l sa,id, you don't go i _nto this retail business-. Let I s go i _nto wholesale, r 
sa,id, do you not know tha,t Vietnam i _s gett;i,ng divided, and the.re will be an 
exodus of thour;:;a.nds of people from the north, and these people all wi:11 need 
medica.l attention and somebody to attend to them. And that is: we (summa,ry; 
giving medicine). • So the JC of the Philippines bough± it, but the mayor of 
Manila hated and the pape:t:'s of Manila were also hitting us, why we · generous ta tha,t 
sort of people, be generous to our own. Anyway, the first group arrived. The 
U • s. emba.i,tsy will not believe- me when I say I need visa for 7 people._ Yes, 
7 people.. Ok, issue visa; UoS. embassy arranged visa. That is how we started 
Opera.tion Brotherhood. Now this is a medical operati_on, supposed to be from 
people to people, actually can never get off the ground by itself. Our own 
medi_cines would not go far, but that's how we started in Vietnam. We re.ally 
want this, becaus.e i _t w;i,11 force the Vietna,mese to do it themselves-, 
half 
Now, we. sta,rted S-mi'l,11, r;:;ma,11, sma.11, but then this whole/peninsula 
wa,s dumped into the hands of the :Republic of Vie.tnam. This, is the whole. 
south. you know occupied by the Vietnamese (materi.al omitted). . I organized 
them .;tntq mob.tle te9,,ms. Ed was with. me a,lrea,dy, i3,nd Ed understa,nds the 
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B: whole. thing. And so Bo is here and Bo i .s the Manila manager, you 
know·; what -we as.k, Bo produces. ,A.nd they s:ta.rt coming from the plane d;trect 
to Ca,ma,u o.ecause we were. going to take over Camau at midnight, and tfie.y arrived 
in the afternoon and we have enough time only to go from the airport to go ta 
the Peninsula? of Camau, and on midnight, take over. That was very· dra,matlc , 
The Viet Cong was already there, When we ..• 
(pa.use on ta,pel 
.• , send the medicine by air, a.tr drop, and sa,ve the person, things 
like tha,t, every day. Say this is your government, this· is your own government 
now. PreS'ident D.tem, he went there. The chief of staff, he- went there. 
(summary: I got pass from Viet Minh, and entered at __ , no roads, 
a,11 by canal. Officer there surrounded by Vietnarnes-e, his name is Due (?L 
Due say shout across every night; contest in psychologi,caJ warfare •• , 1 
END OF TAPE ..1 
TAPE 2 
B; •• , we met hi.m on the street i.n Sa.;i.gon. When ha see me he wi:11 g:i;ca,h 
me and embrace. me and -cry and cry in the middle of the street • • 
¥au know·, there a.re people who wi.11 say tha. t the. Vietnamese cannot he. 
trusted; it ;i.s not always true. :C ha.ye "Vietni;\f(\6.$;e. f):; tends who s•tood fa,st W'ith_ 
' ' 
us through_ thick a,nd thin up to the end. Ed himself: h9d- his very close friends, 
Vietnamese, 
C: Why do you think ;!.t wa,s tha,t La.nsdale, an Americ9n, w~s ~hle. tq "\'.Ork 
so well with F;Uipinos and Vietna.lT\ese? 
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B: Because Ed knows the psychology. Second, Ed is very sincere, He does 
not do it for anything else but for sincerity. Ed, he opens his- heart. He i.s-' 
misunderstood, all these people--they don't know Ed. He is· a person that i _s 
very warm. He is not one of those who will pretend to be your f'.riend for 
ulterior motives---no, He is so straight, you see, ,And this- was true of 
Magsaysay also, Very simple, simple tastes; very· human, down to earth , No 
airs, no ai.r of nothing, It is like monks, like monks:, you know, -One tiil)e_ 
Ma,gsaysay pulled me in the plane beca,use I: ha,d so ,ma,ny pa,pers for him. to sign, 
We landed in Calgayan (phonetic? ) and he was wearing a s·tra,w- hat and the people 
there were laughing. Mr. Secretary, why a,re you wearing that hat? (summary; 
he rec,;tted poem, about poor a,nd simple, etc. I a,lmost crie,d listening to him . } 
ds,y. before he died I with wi.th him; he. sai_d why 2\:t'e you hr.;tnging President Diem? 
He. told me he just wants to wa,lk with you in the beach. President Mags-aysay 
said, ok, we will walk in the beach at Barong (sp?). ,And then the next day, 
he died, Of course I flew the next day--the President was walking back and forth__ 
in the. palace, always calling me, was there any news. Two people who were also 
like monks, you know. President Diem mourned President Magsaysay, 
You know during the war against the Viet Minh, Ed mus·t have told you, 
in the. mountain of Neubaodin (phonetic), that is the black lady mountain, there: 
was a Vi,etnamese general by the name of Trinh Minh The (7)_ who was a very, very 
close friend of Ed's, we used to air drop ai_d to Trinh. M;Lnh_ The, and Trinh 
Minh The and me came to know each other, and he di,s another very simple man . 
,And all he wanted was to see Magsaysay, and I arri3.nged i_t, for him to come- here 
a,nd meet the Pres'ident, but then there wa,s th;Ls uprising i_ns:ide Saigon a,nd 
Trinh Minh_ The, you know, led,,.you know, what the French_were doing was 
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B: helping the. rebels and trying to prevent them from being cut off 
from the rear. And Tr.;inh Minh The. led his forces across the'. river, on the 
br.;Ldge, he. was shot. He died. President Ngo Dinh Diem cried. Ed was· 
(unintelligible) 
C: 
This charm of Ed's, very sincere, As I sai,d, a ver:y since.re man . 
Let me ask you .one more question, sir. I didn I t qui,te understand 
your relationship with Louis:e (?) Magsaysay. 
B: Louise ;is my cousirt. , 
C: I thought you were her brother. 
B: No, no. She was not my brother. Lou;t.s Ma.gsays'i':l,y;'· s -.-fa.the;r; i .s Jose 
Banzon, the same as. my name.. And her sister was my cla.s·smate in lil.gh. school; 
we. are distant cousins. 
C: Not even first cousins? 
B;: · Not even first cousi.ns. But when I flrst sta;i;ted Ma.gsa.ysay thouglit 
I was very ·close to her and he picks me out (unintelligible.l · but later on so , •• 
$0 the li.fe of Magsaysay and the life of Ed, you know, they have 
common ideals. 
Ed asked me one time., di.d we do wrong in Vi.e:tna.m? J: Si'l.i.d, no . I said, 
if we did not do wha.t we did i.n Vietnam, it would not have lasted that long . 
Because in 1950 af;'ter the fall of;' Dien Blen Phu, the. people were demoralized; 
the people were selling their houses; everybody was mov;t,ng to Europe, to 'France . 
You can buy cars very, very cheap. Just a matter of;' t;Lme before the Viet Minh 
will take over, That was the time when we came in. And that is the time when 
work.? 
Ed will wa,lk so ha.rd until you can see his: eyes are twitching , we. ~g,I~H7so ha.rd, 
worked? 
He walked so hard. ;r::t was not so easy to make a people make a stand, a people 
who feel defea,ted a,lread:'(; 'l!la,ke. a. sta,nd. The, f;i::rst thing we ha.ve to give th.eni 
is some ki.nd of hope. At tha,t t;Lme there. was a government but the. inin.ister$· 
. ' 
I 
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B: do not wa.nt even to go to office. Go to the-ir hous:es-, in
 tnei_r 
pajamas, dr ags them out; we have got a job to do. It was just a question
 of 
time. That is, r think, ·the biggest contribution of Ed; it could have. ended 
ver;y much earlier, thi.s fall of Vietnam. You see from the. period of 
Dien Bi en 
Phu when everything is ~zero, up, up up, We at least ha.d an Army thl'l,t
 fough.t , 
We had a government that at times knew what it was doing , President 
Di.em 
was all right until he became a little hardheaded, His brother--r to
ld him, 
ear;ly to get rid of his: brother. And we went ;ln a celeb:r-ati'on in the
. Del ta . 
After that he took another pla,ne, and we flew to a coastal town, we went
 
aboard a ship. That's the fi.r:st time he went on board a ship in Vietn
am . 
I was laughing because there is no saluting gun; we had only an anti-
aircraft 
gun, and we fired the gun up. We were laughing, SalutedtiiePresi.de
nt. 
In the evening I was. the only one (unintell;i.gihlel . The. president lik
ed to 
read what some director i .s telling a.bout you? Yes . l: work- for newsp
aper 
(summary: better read. Then d;Ldn't want to go on in war. F±lippine 
sena,tor 
called him so and so and so). Then I told him: Mr . President, do yo
u know 
one Philippine president lost hi.s off ice be.ca.use. of a brother . Presi
dent 
Quirino lost an election beca,use of a, brother, Tony Qui.r i no, be.cause. 
of a, 
scandal. I sai.d, why don't ~you remove Ngo Dinh_ Nuh? 
C: What was his response? 
B: Do you know what hi.s response was.? He grow very red , and he refuse 
to talk. to me. Later on, yea:r:s later on, you know I left , :C went to
 rndonesi'a, 
a,nd my· f:t;iends told me, get back, get back; the president is· surround
ed by 
people who are very bad. It is too late. He s aJ ,d, some people are s
aying 
things aoout my ~other, but all that my brothe;r: does, · I know, and everythi ng 
tha,t my br other doe.s, I approv e , I sai d, tha,t ~s the end, The- brother is toe. 
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B: one that took down Ngo Dinh Diem. Ma.da;m Nhu a,nd Mr . Nhu. Pres;i:;dent 
Ngo D;t.nh. Diem, I don't know--sometimes the Vi.etnamese do not want to be. told, 
you know. But if he removed Ngo Dinh Nhu at tha;t time and he went straight, 
ma,yhe tha;t could have helped him. Not entirely, but help him. 
C: Well, Mr. Banzon, J have taken up a;n a,wful lot of your time • •• 
B: So many things, you know . .. 
I think another aspect of Ed's I he had to fight fellow A.me.ricans, 
you know, in the Embassy. Members of the usrs, chief of us.rs, the ,milita;ry, 
and the political advisers, and so on and so on, Many times he comes out a.nd 
tells us. 
One thing good, Ed's support of his colle.a;gues . He got a, lot of 
support. He wa;s so well respected. Westmorela,nd listens, to him . At the 




Sulphurt,c c\Cid. HCL--llenry Cc\bot Lodge. Comi.tted a;bout HCLL Abrams, 
Not Abrams .•• among the ambassadors . • . 
Oh, Taylor. Taylor had a ha.rd time. 
we could have ended the fighting earli.er. Y:ou know wh-Y? The. 
~~-
general Wc\nted to surrender to us, just only· ..• the p:i:::•ope,r conditions-•• • 
JNTERVIEW ENDS 
Jose Banzon interview, 30 July 1985 
~t-spokenver~ humblP. wHh :r: ef initaLi'i1e, new j deas . 
. . . . ~ simplL..-~ ~ he wanled ce ~ farmer. They [E~] 
have simi--l-ar tasle5i0ne is innovative, Etre ocher one is ver y r~_,. 
Ed and me got close in VN. I went as observer, supposed to stay only 
for 3 months, but developed on into 5 yes, because Ed arrived. He said, 
Joe, will you give me a briefing? I did. 
At that time the VNese were holding only 4 ministries and the bulk of 
the ministries were being held by the French. How can you call this a 
VNese govt? 
